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Abstract
The specification and enforcement of authorization policies such as separation of duty and
binding of duty in workflow systems is an important area of current research in computer
security. We introduce a formal model for constrained workflow systems that incorporate
constraints for implementing such policies. We define an entailment constraint, which is
defined on a pair of tasks in a workflow, and show that such constraints can be used to
model many familiar authorization policies. We show that a set of entailment constraints
can be manipulated algebraically in order to compute all possible dependencies between
tasks in the workflow. The resulting set of constraints form the basis for an analysis of the
satisfiability of a workflow. We briefly consider how this analysis can be used to implement
a reference monitor for workflow systems.
1 Introduction
The term “workflow” was first used to describe the scheduling of jobs on a mainframe
computer by the operating system [6]. The term is now used generically to describe an
ordered collection of tasks T each of which needs to be performed by an appropriate agent.
Typical examples of workflows include purchase order processing [4], the handling and
refereeing of papers in electronic journals [2], and the processing of tax refunds [3]: indeed,
practically any complex business process can be modelled as a workflow.
However, there remain significant challenges to be resolved before we see the widespread
use of sophisticated commercial computerized workflow management systems. Of particu-
lar interest to the security community is the problem of authorizing users to execute tasks
within a workflow while enforcing constraints such as separation of duty on the execution
of those tasks [2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 14].
Role-based access control (RBAC) is a natural paradigm to apply to authorization in
workflow systems because of the correspondence between tasks and permissions. In recent
years, a considerable amount of work has been done on the use of RBAC to support access
control in workflow systems [1, 3, 7, 14].
However, a role-based model alone is not sufficient to meet all the authorization re-
quirements of workflow systems such as separation of duty constraints and binding of duty
constraints. Separation of duty requirements exist to prevent conflicts of interest and to
make fraudulent acts more difficult to commit. A simple example of a separation of duty
constraint would be to require two different signatures on a cheque. Binding of duty con-
straints require that if a certain user executed a particular task then that user must also
execute a second task in the workflow. Additionally, cardinality constraints are used to
specify that a particular task must be performed a given number of times, optionally by a
given number of different users.
In the context of workflow systems, a separation of duty requirement may be that two
tasks are performed by different users (or different roles). There exist several schemes
and models in the literature for specifying separation of duty constraints [2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 14]
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and cardinality constraints [3] in workflow systems. We also note that that order-based
separation of duty in role-based systems [8] can, and probably should, be studied in the
context of workflows.
We model a workflow specification as an ordered set of tasks and a constrained workflow
specification as an ordered set of tasks together with a set of authorization constraints.
A (constrained) workflow authorization schema is a (constrained) workflow specification
augmented by authorization information. A workflow system comprises a collection of
workflow authorization schemata and a reference monitor. Each workflow schemata may
be instantiated and executed as a sequence of tasks, which we will refer to as an instance of
the workflow. We assume that the reference monitor will ensure that only authorized users
perform tasks and that it will ensure all authorization constraints for a particular schema
are satisfied in each workflow instance of that schema. The existence of both authorization
information and constraints means that the design and analysis of reference monitors in
workflow systems is rather more difficult than for similar mechanisms in computer file
systems or relational database management systems, which usually make decisions based
solely on authorization information. We believe that there are three distinct, but related,
problems in workflow systems.
1. Is the constrained workflow specification satisfiable? In other words, is it possi-
ble for a workflow instance based on this specification to be completed so that all
constraints are satisfied? Note that this question is posed without reference to au-
thorization information. A trivial example of a workflow specification that is not
satisfiable contains two tasks t and t′ and two constraints: no user can perform t and
t′ (separation of duty) and the same user must perform t and t′ (binding of duty).
2. Is the workflow authorization schema satisfiable? In other words, is it possible for
a workflow instance based on this schema to be completed? A trivial example of a
schema that is not satisfiable contains a task t which no user is authorized to execute.
3. Is a workflow instance in a workflow system satisfiable? In other words, given that a
number of tasks in a workflow specification have been completed, can the remaining
tasks be completed and the authorization constraints be satisfied?
Most research in this area has focused on the third of these questions. Solutions to this
question have typically involved constructing a reference monitor that enforces authoriza-
tion constraints. In this paper we adopt a formal, algebraic approach to the first of these
questions and demonstrate how it can be used to answer the remaining questions and how
it can help in the design of a reference monitor for workflow systems.
The difficulty of such issues is compounded because there is no consensus on the spec-
ification and scope of authorization constraints. In particular, different authors consider
different types of constraints and different methods of implementing a reference monitor.
Bertino et al , for example, consider cardinality constraints and role-based constraints and
implement a reference monitor using logic programming techniques [3], whereas Casati
et al consider binding of duty constraints and use active database technology to enforce
constraints [7].
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In order to provide a clear analysis of workflow systems and to design a reference
monitor for such systems, it is vital to have a sound and unambiguous interpretation of
authorization constraints. In this paper we claim that many of the constraints that have
been considered in the literature are special cases of a general type of constraint, which we
call an entailment constraint. We also argue that role-based constraints of the form “task
t2 must be performed by a role that is more senior that the role that performed task t1” are
not well defined and suggest how they can be recast either as a constraint on authorization
information or as a user-based constraint. We also demonstrate that cardinality constraints
can be specified as entailment constraints.
In this paper we clarify precisely what types of authorization constraints should be
considered in workflow systems and how to interpret such constraints. We propose a
powerful, simple, intuitive method for defining entailment constraints and illustrate how
they can be used to specify separation of duty constraints, binding of duty constraints
and cardinality constraints. In doing this we hope to provide a standard reference model
for future research into constraints in workflow systems, thereby simplifying the task of
designing and analyzing reference monitors for such systems.
Our scheme, described in Section 2, is based on binary relations defined on the set of
users. Concepts from relation algebra can be used to combine relations and hence derive
compound constraints on tasks. In this section we also introduce the important concept
of an execution schedule, an abstraction of a workflow instance. In Section 3 we develop
an algebra for entailment constraints that enables us to simplify and combine constraints.
This gives rise to the notion of the closure of a set of authorization constraints. This in
turn gives rise to a new workflow schema that is satisfiable if and only if the original schema
is satisfiable. In Section 4 we describe how this powerful result enables us to develop new
methods for analyzing the satisfiability of workflow schemata and workflow instances.
It is important to note that the lack of space prevents this paper from making a sig-
nificant contribution to the design or implementation of a role-based reference monitor
for workflow systems that incorporate authorization constraints. Important work has al-
ready been done in this area using stratified logic programs [3, 14] and active database
technology [7]. Nevertheless, we believe that the implementation details in such research
have sometimes obscured the problem at hand and have considered different notions of
authorization constraints, making a comparative analysis of different approaches rather
difficult.
Our thesis is that a formal definition of authorization constraints and the satisfaction
of such constraints in a workflow instance, coupled with a rigorous analysis of authoriza-
tion constraints, will lead to improved models for role-based reference monitors in workflow
systems. Indeed, our work on the unsatisfiability of a set of constraints already suggests al-
ternative ways of implementing a reference monitor that enforces authorization constraints.
Developing a model for such a reference monitor will be our immediate priority in future
work, which is discussed more fully in Section 5.
3
2 A Model for Constrained Workflow Systems
A workflow specification is a partially ordered set of tasks T. (We use T to denote the
set of tasks in the specification. We will write t to denote a task in a workflow instance
corresponding to the task t ∈ T.) Let U be a set of users. A workflow authorization
schema is a pair (T, A), where A contains sufficient information to enable us to derive a
relation TU ⊆ T× U and (t, u) ∈ TU means that u is authorized to perform (or execute)
t. A could comprise, for example, a partially ordered set of roles R, a user-role assignment
relation UA ⊆ U × R and a task-role assignment relation TA ⊆ T× R. We now consider
the specification of authorization constraints in a workflow schema.
2.1 Entailment Constraints
We believe that a specification scheme for authorization constraints should have the fol-
lowing properties.
• It must be unambiguous.
• It must provide sufficient expressive power to capture a wide range of security re-
quirements including separation of duty constraints, binding of duty constraints and
cardinality constraints.
• It must be simple enough to be used by application designers and departmental
administrators.
• It must be independent of the underlying workflow and the reference monitor.
• It must be amenable to analysis.
In this section we describe our specification scheme, which is based on binary relations
defined on the set of users. Such relations are expressive, intuitive and can be manipulated
algebraically, enabling us to derive new constraints that simplify the analysis of workflows.
Let Rel(U) denote the set of all binary relations on U . (In other words, Rel(U) is the
powerset of U × U .) We use the following notation, which is standard in the study of
relation algebras [11].
0 = ∅ (1)
0′ = {(u, v) : u, v ∈ U, u 6= v} (2)
1′ = {(u, u) : u ∈ U} (3)
1 = 1′ ∪ 0′ = U × U (4)
An entailment constraint has the form (D, (t, t′), ρ), where D ⊆ U , ρ ∈ Rel(U) and
t 6> t′. A constrained workflow authorization schema is a triple (T, A, C), where C is a set
of entailment constraints.
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Informally, if users u and u′ perform t and t′, respectively, and u ∈ D, then constraint
(D, (t, t′), ρ) is satisfied iff (u, u′) ∈ ρ. In other words, the constraint is not applied if u 6∈ D.
We refer to D as the domain of the constraint. We will define constraint satisfaction
formally in the next section.
Hence a separation of duty constraint can be expressed as (D, (t, t′), 0′) and a binding
of duty constraint can be expressed as (D, (t, t′), 1′). Henceforth, we will usually write
(D, (t, t′), 6=) instead of (D, (t, t′), 0′) and (D, (t, t′),=) instead of (D, (t, t′), 1′), because it
is more intuitive notation. However, in order to maintain clarity, we will use 0′ and 1′ when
we form compound binary relations.
In fact, any binary relation between users can be used in an entailment constraint
(including those that can be derived from contextual information). Hence it is possible
to articulate constraints of the form “tasks t and t′ must be performed by two different
users in the same department”. If we assume the existence of group-based or role-based
authorization structures, then it is possible to induce an ordering (binary relation) on
the set of users determined by the relative seniority of the groups or roles to which each
user is assigned. The relation l ∈ Rel(U) will be used to denote a partial ordering 6 on
users, which may be derived, depending on context, from role information, organizational
information or the user groups to which users belong.
We anticipate that this relation will prove particularly important, because it is natural
to implement access control in workflow systems using role-based techniques. Briefly, each
task and user is assigned to one or more roles and a user u is authorized to perform a task
t if u if u and t are both assigned to the same role. The administration of such systems
can be greatly reduced if a role hierarchy is employed. Then u is authorized to perform a
task t if u is implicitly assigned to a role to which t is also assigned. In other words, u is
assigned to a role at least as senior as a role to which t is assigned. We examine practical
applications of this in Section 2.3.
2.2 Linear Extensions of a Workflow Specification
Let 〈X,6〉 be a partially ordered set. A linear extension of X is a total ordering of the
elements of X that respects the ordering of the elements in X. In other words, 〈X,4〉 is
a linear extension of 〈X,6〉 if for all x1, x2 ∈ X, either x1 4 x2 or x2 4 x1, and if x1 6 x2
then x1 4 x2.
1 We denote the set of linear extensions of X by L(X).
Linear extensions are important in the context of workflows because they “linearize” a
partially ordered set of tasks. In other words, a linear extension of T represents a possible
sequence of execution of the tasks in a workflow. Figure 1 shows a simple example of a
workflow specification having three linear extensions.
Definition 1 Let (T, A, C) be a constrained workflow authorization schema. An execution
schedule for (T, A, C) is a pair (L, α), where L ∈ L(T) and α : T → U assigns tasks to
users, such that for all t ∈ T, (t, α(t)) ∈ A, and for all (D, (t, t′), ρ) ∈ C, if α(t) ∈ D then
(α(t), α(t′)) ∈ ρ.
1Linear extensions are obtained by topologically sorting X [10].
5
tt1
t
t2
t
t3
t
t6
t
t4
t
t5
- - - 
 
 
 
 
 
-
@
@
@
@
@
@R
(a)
t1 ≺ t2 ≺ t3 ≺ t4 ≺ t5 ≺ t6
t1 ≺ t2 ≺ t4 ≺ t3 ≺ t5 ≺ t6
t1 ≺ t2 ≺ t4 ≺ t5 ≺ t3 ≺ t6
(b)
Figure 1: A simple workflow specification and its linear extensions
In other words, an execution schedule respects the relative ordering of tasks in the
workflow specification (since it is a linear extension of T), every task is performed by an
appropriately authorized user and every entailment constraint is satisfied. A constrained
workflow authorization schema is satisfiable if there exists an execution schedule for the
schema (and unsatisfiable otherwise).
2.3 Other Constraints in Workflow Systems
2.3.1 Role-based entailment constraints
Constraints of the form “t2 must be performed by a role that is more senior than the role
that performed t1” have received attention in the literature [2, 3]. It seems superficially
attractive to extend the specification scheme for entailment constraints to include role-
based ones of the form (S, {t, t′}, pred), where S ⊆ R. However, we believe that such
constraints are inappropriate in the wider context of role-based access control and should
generally be expressed as constraints on the authorization schema. The constraint “t2 must
be performed by a role that is more senior than the role that performed t1”, for example,
could be re-formulated as “for every role to which task t1 is assigned, there must be a more
senior role to which t2 is assigned”. An advantage of this approach is that such constraints
can be enforced once by the authorization information, rather than in each instance of the
workflow. In the remainder of this section, we justify more fully why we believe role-based
entailment constraints should not be used.
In order for a user u to perform task t, u must be assigned to some role r and the task
must be assigned to some role r′ such that r′ 6 r.However, the answer to the question
“Which role performed task t?” is ambiguous. There are two obvious answers to this
question: either r because this role implicitly assigns u to r′, the role that is assigned
to t; or r′ because it is the role that is assigned to task t. Nevertheless, both of these
interpretations have their problems. In the first case, what happens if u is assigned to
two roles r1 and r2 that are both greater than r
′ and r1 and r2 are not comparable in the
role hierarchy? Which of r1 and r2 is considered to be the role that performed t? In the
second case, what happens if t is assigned to two roles r′1 and r
′
2 that are both less than
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r? Which of r′1 and r
′
2 is considered to be the role that performed t? In order to address
these problems, we consider two simplifying assumptions.
Assumption 1 Every task is assigned to precisely one role. Therefore, we can assume
that the role that performed the task is the role to which it is explicitly assigned. This
means that any role-based constraints can be checked statically. For example, to enforce
an entailment constraint of the form (R, {t, t′}, <), it is sufficient to check that t and t are
assigned to roles r and r′, respectively, with r < r′.
Assumption 2 Every user is assigned to precisely one role. We then assume that the role
that performed a task is the role to which the user who performed the task is assigned. In
this case, it is not possible check role-based constraints statically.
Either way, it seems clear that role-based entailment constraints of the form “t2 must
be performed by a role that is more senior than the role that performed t1” are at best
ambiguous unless we make one of the two assumptions described above. Unfortunately,
imposing such limitations on a role-based authorization scheme rather dilutes the power
of the RBAC paradigm. The second assumption, in particular, reduces the access control
mechanism to one that is equivalent to Unix groups. In short, either role-based entailment
constraints cannot be interpreted or they require simplifications to the RBAC model that
compromise the advantages provided by the RBAC paradigm.
Finally, we note the following quote: “. . . if several roles are authorized to execute a
task and no order for those roles is specified . . . the task can be performed by any of the
roles” [3]. We would argue that this alone is a strong justification for believing that it is
not possible in general to state unambiguously which role performed a given task.
An alternative approach is to state conditions on the assignment of roles to tasks.
Henceforth, constraints of the form “t2 must be performed by a role that is more senior
than the role that performed t1” will be implemented by making appropriate task-role as-
signments (as suggested in the opening paragraph of this section). Clearly, the satisfaction
of this constraint can be determined by an analysis of the workflow authorization schema.
2.3.2 Additional user-based entailment constraints
Nevertheless, we are left with the problem of implementing security requirements of the
following form: “t2 must be performed by a user who is more senior than the user who
performed t1”. Consider the following scenario: a workflow includes tasks that prepare a
cheque and approve the release of the cheque to the payee. The preparation of the cheque is
assigned to a clerical role, while the approval is assigned to a managerial role. The semantics
of role-based access control mean that a user assigned to a role r can perform any task
assigned to a role r′ such that r′ 6 r. Hence a manager (acting in a managerial role) can
prepare a cheque payment and part of our security policy may require that such a cheque
has to be approved by a senior manager. Certainly, user-based entailment constraints can
be used to prevent the same user preparing and approving a cheque payment, but how can
we implement the security requirement described above?
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The answer is to define binary relations based on the role hierarchy and the assign-
ment of users to roles. Let R(u) denote the set of roles assigned to a user u. That is,
R(u) = {r ∈ R : r 6 r′, (u, r′) ∈ UA}. We define the following relations.
e = {(u, v) : u, v ∈ U,R(u) = R(v)} (5)
l = {(u, v) : u, v ∈ U,R(u) ⊆ R(v)} (6)
g = {(u, v) : u, v ∈ U,R(u) ⊇ R(v)} = l˜ (7)
Essentially, the set of roles assigned to each user and the role hierarchy induce an
ordering on the set of users. A user u is less senior than another user u′ if u′ is assigned to
all the roles to which u is assigned. Note that l is not a partial ordering on the set of users,
since it is not anti-symmetric. In other words, it may be the case that (u, v), (v, u) ∈ l but
u 6= v. In this case, the users have equivalent authority (hence the use of e for the set of
pairs (u, v) such that R(u) = R(v)).
To help the reader we will generally use the more familiar infix notation for relations
in the body of constraints and write
u = u′ if (u, u) ∈ 1′,
u ∼= v if (u, v) ∈ e,
u 6 v if (u, v) ∈ l,
u > v if (u, v) ∈ g.
We also write
u 6= v if (u, v) ∈ 0′,
u < v if (u, v) ∈ l \ e,
u > v if (u, v) ∈ g \ e.
However, we will tend to use the relation symbols when writing algebraic expressions such
as 0′∩1′ = ∅ in order to avoid inelegant and rather cryptic statements of the form 6= ∩ == ∅.
Figure 2 shows the ordering induced on a set of users by the role hierarchy and the
UA relation. Note that R(u) ⊆ R(v) if for every role r such that (u, r) ∈ UA, there ex-
ists r′ such that r 6 r′ and (v, r′) ∈ UA. Hence, Alice < Eve, for example, because
(Alice, FinAdmin), (Eve, FinAdmin) ∈ UA and (Alice, POClerk), (Eve, POAdmin) ∈ UA
and POClerk < POAdmin.
The analysis of the previous section suggested that role-based entailment constraints
should be recast as constraints on the assignment of tasks to roles. In this section we have
shown that security requirements regarding the relative seniority of user can be enforced
by defining entailment constraints with suitable binary relations. In the next section we
consider how cardinality constraints can be expressed as entailment constraints. Hence
we will have shown that many of the authorization constraints in the literature can be
expressed as entailment constraints. However, we note that we cannot specify constraints
8
of the following form: “If more that four activations of task t1 executed by a single user
within a single instance of a workflow abort then that user cannot execute task t1” [3]. In
fact, we do not consider such constraints to be authorization constraints. We believe that
such constraints have more in common with “lockout” policies for user accounts, which are
used to disable an account if an incorrect password is entered too many times consecutively.
These policies often have a number of parameters, including the number of fail attempts
that are tolerated, and when and who may unlock an account. We believe that such policies
should be addressed independently of authorization constraints.
We also note that using our framework it is possible to express constraints that have
not been considered previously. For example, we can insist that two different tasks are
performed by users who have equivalent powers using a constraint of the form (D, (t, t′),∼=).
We also note that it is easy to define constraints that can prevent collusion between family
or friends working within the same enterprise by defining an appropriate binary relation
encoding undesirable associations between pairs of users.
2.3.3 Cardinality constraints
Like role-based entailment constraints, cardinality constraints have received a considerable
amount of attention in the literature [2, 3, 14]. Informally, a cardinality constraint requires
that a task be executed a number of different times by a number of different users. Note
that in order to enforce such constraints, we must know which user and role performed
each instance of the task. In other words, there has to be some sequence of task instances
and we can treat the k instances of t as distinct sequential tasks upon which entailment
constraints are defined. In the remainder of this section, we demonstrate that task-based
cardinality constraints can be specified as entailment constraints.
A task-based cardinality constraint can be modelled as a tuple (t, k, nu, nr). The in-
terpretation of this constraint is that task t has to be performed k times by at least nu
different users and at least nr different roles. If nu (respectively nr) is not specified, then
there is no restriction on the users (roles) that can perform task t.
Given the argument in Section 2.3.1, we do not believe that it is possible to identify
which role performs an instance of a task. We note that the most comprehensive treat-
ment of task-based cardinality constraints assumes that each instance of the same task is
performed by the same role [3].
Hence we can assume that a task-based cardinality constraint has the form (t, k, n).
There are three cases to consider: n is not specified (n = null), n = k and n < k. In the
first two cases we simply modify the workflow specification to include k tasks t1 < · · · < tk
instead of the single instance of t. In order to enforce the cardinality constraint (t, k, k)
we define entailment constraints (U, {ti, tj}, 6=) (1 6 i < j 6 k) for the modified workflow.
The cardinality constraint (t, k, null) does not require any entailment constraints in the
modified workflow. In order to implement a cardinality constraint of the form (t, k, n),
where n < k, we define k tasks t1, . . . , tk such that t1 < · · · < tn and t1 < tn+1 < tn, t1 <
tn+2 < tn, . . . , t1 < tk < tn. In addition we define entailment constraints (U, {ti, tj}, 6=),
1 6 i < j 6 n, to ensure that at least n different users perform the tasks in {t1, . . . , tk}.
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We do not consider workflow-based cardinality constraints of the form “at least three
roles must be involved in completing a workflow” [3]. As before, we believe such a constraint
should be enforced by appropriate task-role assignments. However, a constraint of the form
“at least three users must be involved in completing a workflow” cannot be enforced using
entailment constraints (because it is not obvious which tasks should be antecedent tasks).
We are not aware, however, of any attempts to specify or enforce such constraints.
2.4 An example of a constrained workflow schema
Let us consider the simple workflow forming part of a purchase ordering and financial
system depicted in Figure 3(a). There are six tasks involved in ordering and paying for
goods:
• the creation of a purchase order requesting goods from a supplier (createPO);
• the approval of the purchase order prior to despatch to the supplier (apprPO);
• the acknowledgement of delivery of the goods by signing a goods received note
(signGRN);
• the acknowledgement of delivery by countersigning the goods received note
(ctrsignGRN);
• the creation of a payment file on receipt of the supplier’s invoice for the goods
(createPay);
• the approval of the payment to the supplier (subject to receipt of goods) (apprPay).
The entailment constraints for these tasks together with a brief explanation are shown in
Figure 3(b). We believe that these constraints form a realistic set of security requirements
for such a workflow. Note that because createPay and signGRN are not comparable in
the workflow specification, we need two constraints, c5 and c6, to prevent a user raising a
payment for goods that he has signed for.
3 The Algebra of Entailment Constraints
Let ρ, σ ∈ Rel(U) and let V ⊆ U . Then we define
ρ˜ = {(v, u) : (u, v) ∈ ρ}, (8)
ρσ = {(u,w) : ∃v ∈ U, (u, v) ∈ ρ, (v, w) ∈ σ}, (9)
U1(ρ) = {u ∈ U : (u, v) ∈ ρ}, (10)
U2(ρ) = {v ∈ U : (u, v) ∈ ρ}, (11)
V = {u ∈ U : u 6∈ V }. (12)
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We say ρ˜ is the converse of ρ and ρσ is the relative product or composition of ρ and σ. We
have the following simple results for all ρ ⊆ 1:
1ρ = U × U2(ρ) and ρ1 = U1(ρ)× U,
ρ1′ = 1′ρ = ρ,
ρ0 = 0ρ = 0,
1ρ = ρ1,
and
11′ = 1′1 = 10′ = 0′1 = 0′0′ = 1.
Proposition 2 (Merging domains) Let (T, A, {(D1, (t, t
′), ρ), (D2, (t, t
′), ρ)} be a con-
strained workflow authorization schema. Then (L, α) is a workflow execution sched-
ule for (T, A, {(D1, (t, t
′), ρ), (D2, (t, t
′), ρ)} iff (L, α) is a workflow execution schedule for
(T, A, {D1 ∪D2, (t, t
′), ρ}).
Proof The proof is immediate. 
In other words, we can assume that there is at most one constraint for a given (ordered)
pair of tasks (t, t′) and a given binary relation ρ.
Proposition 3 (Expanding the domain) Let (T, A, {(D, (t, t′), ρ)}) be a constrained
workflow authorization schema and define σ = (U \ D) × U . Then (L, α) is a workflow
execution schedule for (T, A, {(D, (t, t′), ρ)}) iff (L, α) is a workflow execution schedule for
(T, A, {(U, (t, t′), ρ ∪ σ)}).
Proof If (L, α) is an execution schedule for (T, A, {D, (t, t′), ρ}) then either α(t) ∈ D and
(α(t), α(t′)) ∈ ρ, or α(t) 6∈ D, in which case (α(t), α(t′)) ∈ σ, by definition of σ. In either
case, constraint (U, (t, t′), ρ ∪ σ) is satisfied.
If (L, α) is an execution schedule for (T, A, {(U, (t, t′), ρ ∪ σ)}) then either α(t) ∈ D,
in which case (α(t), α(t′)) ∈ ρ, by definition of σ, and (D, (t, t′), ρ) is satisfied; otherwise
α(t) 6∈ D and (D, (t, t′), ρ) is vacuously satisfied. 
In other words, we can assume that the domain of every constraint is U . Henceforth,
we will omit the domain from our constraints.
Proposition 4 (Merging constraints) Let W = (T, A, {((t, t′), ρ1), ((t, t
′), ρ2)}) be a
constrained workflow authorization schema. Then (L, α) is an execution schedule for W
iff (L, α) is an execution schedule for (T, A, {((t, t′), ρ ∩ ρ2)}).
Proof The proof is immediate. 
11
In other words, we can assume that for each pair of tasks (t, t′) there is a single con-
straint. (If two constraints contain the same pair of tasks, then we can replace them with
a single constraint using the proposition above.)
Proposition 5 (Composing constraints) Let W = (T, A, {((t, t′), ρ1), ((t
′, t′′), ρ2)}) be
a constrained workflow authorization schema. Then (L, α) is an execution schedule for W
iff (L, α) is an execution schedule for (T, A, {((t, t′), ρ1), ((t
′, t′′), ρ2), ((t, t
′′), ρ1ρ2)}).
Proof Let (L, α) be an execution schedule for W . Then (α(t), α(t′)) ∈ ρ1 and
(α(t′), α(t′′)) ∈ ρ2. Hence (α(t), α(t
′′)) ∈ ρ1ρ2 and ((t, t
′′), ρ1ρ2) is satisfied. The proof
is trivial in the other direction. 
It is important to note that if (L, α) is an execution schedule for (T, A, {((t, t′′), ρ1ρ2)}),
then it is not necessarily an execution schedule for (T, A, {((t, t′), ρ1), ((t
′, t′′), ρ2)}). (Al-
though we have (α(t), α(t′′)) ∈ ρ1ρ2, we can not necessarily infer that there exists an
authorized user for t′.) In other words, we cannot delete the constraints from which a
compound constraint is derived.
4 Analyzing Workflows
In this section we discuss the analysis of constrained workflow schemata. Space does not
permit a detailed and formal discussion, which we will be left for future work.
Given a constrained workflow specification, we can enumerate all possible linear ex-
tensions and apply the entailment constraints. In general, the generation of the set of
linear extensions in T can be performed in time O(|L(T)|) [12] and computing |L(T)| is
#P-complete [5]. However, if the width of the poset is small (as will be the case for a
typical workflow specification), then the set of linear extensions can be computed quickly
using dynamic programming techniques. (Each linear extension is a directed path in the
graph of the lattice of order ideals of T, in which the number of nodes is bounded by |T|w,
where w is the width of T. The directed paths can be computed using a breadth-first
search using a number of operations linear in the number of nodes of the graph [13]. In
our example w = 2.)
For each linear extension we compute every implied constraint and then form a single
constraint for each pair of tasks in the linear extension by taking the intersection of all
relations that apply for that pair of tasks. Let C∗ denote the set of constraints obtained
from C in this way. We refer to C∗ as the closure of C.
Theorem 6 (L, α) is an execution schedule for (T, A, C) iff (L, α) is an execution schedule
for (T, A, C∗).
Proof Every constraint c ∈ C∗ is the intersection of one or more constraints of the
form c1c2 . . . cm, where m < |T|. The results in Propositions 4 and 5 can be generalized
using induction to the intersection and composition of k > 2 relations. The result now
follows. 
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The constraints in the closure of the set of constraints for the purchase order workflow
are shown below. For clarity, we use ℓ to denote the binary relation <. The constraints
marked with an asterisk appear in the original set of constraints.
((createPO, apprPO), ℓ)∗
((createPO, createPay), ℓ1 ∩ 0′ ∩ ℓ10′ ∩ ℓ10′0′)
((createPO, signGRN), 1′ ∩ ℓ1 ∩ ℓ10′)
((createPO, ctrsignGRN), 0′ ∩ ℓ10′ ∩ ℓ10′0′)
((createPO, apprPay), ℓ ∩ ℓ0′ ∩ ℓ1ℓ ∩ 0′ℓ ∩ ℓ10′ℓ ∩ ℓ10′0′ℓ)
((apprPO, apprPay), 0′ ∩ ℓ1)
((createPay, signGRN), 0′)∗
((createPay, apprPay), ℓ)∗
((signGRN, createPay), 0′)∗
((signGRN, ctrsignGRN), 0′)∗
((signGRN, apprPay), 0′ℓ)∗
((ctrsignGRN, apprPay), ℓ1)
It can easily be shown that a10′ = a1 for any a ⊆ U ×U and since a ⊆ b implies a∩ b = a,
we obtain
((createPO, apprPO), ℓ)∗
((createPO, createPay), ℓ1 ∩ 0′)
((createPO, signGRN), 1′ ∩ ℓ1)
((createPO, ctrsignGRN), 0′ ∩ ℓ1)
((createPO, apprPay), ℓ ∩ ℓ0′ ∩ ℓ1ℓ ∩ 0′ℓ)
((apprPO, apprPay), 0′ ∩ ℓ1)
((createPay, signGRN), 0′)∗
((createPay, apprPay), ℓ)∗
((signGRN, createPay), 0′)∗
((signGRN, ctrsignGRN), 0′)∗
((signGRN, apprPay), 0′ℓ)∗
((ctrsignGRN, apprPay), ℓ1)
Corollary 7 Let (T, A, C) be a constrained workflow authorization schema. If ((t, t′), ∅) ∈
C∗ then (T, A, C) is unsatisfiable.
Proof The existence of such a constraint implies that no user can perform t (and hence
the workflow (T, A, C∗) is unsatisfiable). The result follows by Theorem 6. 
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Hence we can perform a preliminary analysis of a constrained workflow specification,
without any reference to authorization data. If A is known, then we can also compute all
users that should be allowed to perform tasks if the constraints in C∗ are to be satisfied.
This analysis will perform two purposes: firstly, it will enable us to determine whether the
workflow schema is satisfiable; secondly, it will enable us to modify the authorization data
in order to simplify the design of the reference monitor.
4.1 Determining whether a workflow schema is satisfiable
Let W = (T, A, C) be a constrained workflow authorization schema. For every task t ∈ T
we compute (using the information in A) the set of users authorized to perform t, denoted
U(t). If A is simply a subset of T × U that explicitly assigns tasks to users, then U(t) =
{u ∈ U : (t, u) ∈ A}. If A contains information about the assignment of users and tasks
to roles, then we must realize the assignment of tasks to users as the composition of the
relations TA and U˜A = {(r, u) : (u, r) ∈ UA}. If, in addition, A contains a role hierarchy,
then we realize the assignment of tasks to users as the composition of TA, RH and U˜A,
where (r, r′) ∈ RH iff r 6 r′ in the role hierarchy.
Then for every constraint ((t, t′), ρ) ∈ C∗ we compute whether there are users authorized
to perform t and t′ and who satisfy the constraint. In particular, if (U(t)×U(t′))∩ ρ = ∅,
then there is no pair of users that are authorized to execute the tasks and simultaneously
satisfy the constraint and hence there cannot exist an execution schedule for (T, A, C∗).
Therefore, assuming that the workflow specification itself is satisfiable, we must amend A
so that suitably authorized users exist.
4.2 Revising the assignment of tasks to users
We can undertake a more detailed analysis of a workflow authorization schema to determine
if certain users should be prevented from executing certain tasks because of the subsequent
impossibility of satisfying an authorization constraint. In particular, for each constraint
((t, t′), ρ) ∈ C∗ and for each user in U(t) we compute ({u} × U(t′)) ∩ ρ.2 If this evaluates
to ∅ then no user can perform t′ if u performs t. Hence, we should delete (t, u) from A.
Unfortunately, this is non-trivial if we are using role-based techniques and is even more
difficult if a role hierarchy is being employed. One possible solution is to explicitly associate
tasks that a user is prohibited from executing with the user. The reference monitor then
allows a request (t, i, u) iff (t, u) is authorized by A and u is not prohibited from performing
task t.
2In fact this analysis can be performed by computing U(t, t′) = (U(t) × U(t′)) ∩ ρ and determining
which users appear in U(t) but not in U1(t, t
′) (the projection onto the first element of U(t, t′)). This can
be realized as a relatively simply query in a relational database.
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4.3 Static analysis of idealized users
A role can be regarded as a set of tasks. Hence, for each subset in S ⊆ T we can create the
“role” rS. A role can also be regarded as a collection of users. Hence we can regard each
role rS as a representative of the set of users assigned to the tasks in S. In other words,
we can conduct an analysis of the workflow authorization schema (T, 2T, C∗), where 2T is
the powerset of tasks, and we assume that there is precisely one idealized user for each set
of tasks.
Clearly, there exists a natural ordering on this set of roles: namely, rS 6 rS′ iff S ⊆ S
′.
Indeed, it is reasonable to use this approach for engineering roles and the hierarchy to
which they belong. It may well be the case that not every subset of tasks constitutes a
natural role in the organization and hence we need only consider subsets of T that actually
make sense in the context of the organization and the workflow. In our running example,
we might identify the following sets of tasks as potential roles in the workflow system.
r{createPO} POClerk role
r{createPay} FinClerk role
r{createPO,apprPO,signGRN,ctrsignGRN} POAdmin role
r{createPay,apprPay,signGRN,ctrsignGRN} FinAdmin role
r{createPO,apprPO,createPay,signGRN,ctrsignGRN} FinAdmin and POClerk roles
r{createPay,apprPay,createPO,signGRN,ctrsignGRN} POAdmin and FinClerk roles
r{createPay,apprPay,createPO,apprPO,signGRN,ctrsignGRN} FinAdmin and POAdmin roles
Note that an analysis of the workflow authorization schema (T, A, C), where A as-
sociates each of these roles with the respective tasks, will show that the role r{createPO}
should not be assigned to any user because if createPO is performed by role r{createPO},
then it is not possible for task signGRN to be performed (because of the constraint
((createPO, signGRN),=)). In other words, no role in the live workflow system should
have the single task createPO assigned to it. Hence, the POClerk role should have (at
least) the tasks createPO and signGRN assigned to it. Obviously, this is a simple example,
but it is reasonable to suppose that in more complex workflows, such situations will not
be easy to identify and that this method of finding potential authorization problems will
prove very useful.
4.4 Implementing a Reference Monitor
To simplify the discussion, we assume that there is a single workflow authorization schema
W = (T, A, C) in the system. We denote the ith instance of the schema by W [i]. (It will
be clear that the techniques we describe can be extended to two or more authorization
schemata.)
We assume that three sets of authorization information are maintained by the workflow
system. Firstly, we maintain data structures that enable us to derive a binary relation
TU ⊆ T × U for each workflow specification. This is our authorization data A. In the
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case of a role-based reference monitor, for example, A will consist of a role hierarchy, a
user-role assignment relation and a task-role assignment relation. For convenience we will
write (t, u) ∈ A if u is authorized to perform t (although A may not contain such a pair
explicitly).
In our running example, ((createPO, apprPay), ℓ ∩ ℓ0′ ∩ ℓ1ℓ ∩ 0′ℓ) implies that neither
Eve nor Geoff can execute createPO (because of the relation ℓ1ℓ) despite the fact that
they are both authorized to perform the task. Hence, we also store additional (static)
information prohibiting certain users from performing certain tasks. We will denote this
set of data structures by BS (‘B’ standing for “banned” and ‘S’ standing for “static”).
In addition, we maintain data structures that enable us to derive a binary relation
−TU ⊆ T × N × U , where (t, i, u) ∈ −TU implies that u is prohibited from performing
task t in instance i of the workflow. We will denote this set of data structures by BD (‘D’
standing for “dynamic’.) We will write (t, i, u) ∈ B if u is prohibited from performing
t ∈ T in W [i] (although B may not contain such a pair explicitly). Some of this data may
apply to every instance of a workflow.
The reference monitor will allow the request (t, i, u) in workflow W [i] only if all of the
following conditions are satisfied:
(t, u) 6∈ BS; (13)
(t, i, u) 6∈ BD; (14)
(t, u) ∈ A. (15)
After every task is performed, the reference monitor must also update BD to include
the users that cannot perform subsequent tasks because of the presence of an entailment
constraint. Suppose ((t, t′), 6=) ∈ C, for example, and that u performs t in instance i. Then
(t′, i, u) is added to the information in BD. This kind of postprocessing is found in the
implementations of both Bertino et al and Casati et al .
5 Related and Future Work
The work of Bertino et al guarantees that every workflow instance is satisfiable but this
involves certain computational overheads, whereas Casati et al have a relatively efficient
reference monitor but cannot guarantee that every workflow instance completes. As it
stands, the reference monitor we have described lies somewhere between these two imple-
mentations. The computation of the closure of the set of constraints needs to be performed
once, generates all possible constraints that exist between different tasks and is independent
of authorization information. This makes it more efficient compared to other approaches.
However, our reference monitor does not guarantee that all instances are satisfiable because
the propagation of prohibitions may result in a subsequent task having no users that are
both authorized and not banned from executing the task.
There are alternative methods of implementing a reference monitor given the infor-
mation we have derived in C∗. For example, we could store each execution schedule for
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(T, A, C∗). Each linear extension could refer to a table containing each possible set of
user-task assignments for that linear extension. Given a workflow instance W [i], where tj
has been performed by uj (1 6 j 6 k), and a request (tk+1, i, u), the reference monitor
simply confirms that there exists at least one user-task assignment for each linear extension
that begins [t1, . . . , tk, tk+1]. This guarantees that all constraints are satisfied, all users are
appropriately authorized and that all constraints will be satisfied. However, if the set of
users is large, this approach will be expensively computationally (as is the approach of
Bertino et al). One advantage of this approach is that no processing is required after a
request has been granted. A full analysis of this approach and a comparison with the work
of Bertino et al [3] will the subject of future work.
A further advantage of this approach is that the linear extensions which provide infor-
mation about the sequence in which tasks are performed and the users that can perform
that sequence of tasks is decoupled. This means that if the user base changes, only the user
sequences have to be re-computed. This is not the case for the user-role-assignment graph
of Bertino et al . Moreover, because we do not consider entailment constraints that include
roles, our analysis is independent of the assignment of roles to tasks (provided a user is
acting in a suitably authorized role). Hence we are able to focus on user-based constraints
and to consider constraining relationships between users that have been ignored hitherto.
There are also numerous opportunities for further theoretical work. Corollary 7 provides
a necessary condition for the satisfiability of a workflow schema; it would be interesting
to see what progress could made on providing a sufficient condition. We anticipate that
existing results in model checking theory and relation algebras could help in this respect.
We are also interested in finding an efficient way of computing the constraints in C∗. We
are currently working on a technique that encodes constraints as the entries of an adjacency
matrix for a graph derived from the partial order relation on T. Each constraint can be
realized as an entry in some power of this adjacency matrix. We expect to announce
progress on this issue very soon.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank Szabolcs Mikulas for several stimulating
discussions on relation algebras and Frank Ruskey for his helpful remarks on generating
linear extensions.
References
[1] G.-J. Ahn, R. Sandhu, M.H. Kang, and J.S. Park. Injecting RBAC to secure a web-
based workflow system. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on Role-Based
Access Control, pages 1–10, 2000.
[2] V. Atluri and W. Huang. An authorization model for workflows. In Proceedings of
the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, pages 44–64, 1996.
17
[3] E. Bertino, E. Ferrari, and V. Atluri. The specification and enforcement of authoriza-
tion constraints in workflow management systems. ACM Transactions on Information
and System Security, 2(1):65–104, 1999.
[4] R.A. Botha and J.H.P. Eloff. Separation of duties for access control enforcement in
workflow environments. IBM Systems Journal, 40(3):666–682, 2001.
[5] G. Brightwell and P. Winkler. Counting linear extensions. Order, 8:225–242, 1991.
[6] Burroughs. Work Flow Management User’s Guide, 1973. Burroughs Manual 5000714.
[7] F. Casati, S. Castano, and M. Fugini. Managing workflow authorization constraints
through active database technology. Information Systems Frontiers, 3(3):319–338,
2001. Technical Report HPL-2000-156, Hewlett Packard Laboratories.
[8] T. Jaeger and J. Tidswell. Practical safety in flexible access control models. ACM
Transactions on Information and System Security, 4(2):158–190, 2001.
[9] K. Knorr and H. Stormer. Modeling and analyzing separation of duties in work-
flow environments. In Trusted Information: The New Decade Challenge, IFIP TC11
Sixteenth Annual Working Conference on Information Security, pages 199–212, 2001.
[10] D.E. Knuth. The Art of Computer Programming: Fundamental Algorithms. Addison-
Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 2nd edition, 1973.
[11] R.D. Maddux. Introductory course on relation algebras, finite-dimensional cylindric
algebras, and their interconnections. In H. Andre´ka, J.D. Monk, and I. Ne´meti, editors,
Algebraic Logic, volume 54 of Colloquia Mathematica Societatis Ja´nos Bolyai. Ja´nos
Bolyai Mathematical Society and Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam, 1991.
[12] G. Pruesse and F. Ruskey. Generating linear extensions fast. SIAM Journal on
Computing, 23(2):373–386, 1994.
[13] F. Ruskey. Personal communication. 2004.
[14] J. Wainer, P. Barthelmess, and A. Kumar. W-RBAC – A workflow security model in-
corporating controlled overriding of constraints. International Journal of Cooperative
Information Systems, 12(4):455–486, 2003.
18
tFinClerk
tFinAdmin  
 
 
 
 
t
Manager
tPOClerk
tPOAdmin@
@
@
@
@
(a) The role hierarchy
UA
User Role
Alice FinAdmin
Alice POClerk
Bob FinClerk
Chris POClerk
Dave POAdmin
Eve FinAdmin
Eve POAdmin
Fred POClerk
Fred FinClerk
Geoff Manager
(b) The user-role assignment relation
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(c) The induced user hierarchy
<
User1 User2
Alice Eve
Alice Geoff
Bob Alice
Bob Eve
Bob Fred
Bob Geoff
Chris Alice
Chris Dave
Chris Eve
Chris Fred
Chris Geoff
Dave Eve
Dave Geoff
Eve Geoff
Fred Alice
Fred Eve
Fred Geoff
(d) The relation l \ e
Figure 2: Inducing an ordering on the set of users
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(a) Workflow specification
c1 (U, (createPO, apprPO), <) The user that approves a purchase order must
be more senior than the user that creates it
c2 (U, (createPO, signGRN),=) The user that creates a purchase order must
sign for the goods
c3 (U, (signGRN, ctrsignGRN), 6=) The user that countersigns the GRN must be
different from the user that signed the GRN
c4 (U, (createPO, apprPay), <) The user that approves the payment for goods
must be more senior than the user that or-
dered the goods
c5 (U, (signGRN, createPay), 6=) The user that signs for the goods cannot cre-
ate the payment for those goods
c6 (U, (createPay, signGRN), 6=) The user that creates the payment for the
goods cannot sign for the goods
c7 (U, (createPay, apprPay), <) The user that approves the payment must be
more senior than the user that creates the
payment
c8 (U, (apprPO, apprPay), 6=) The user that approves the purchase order
cannot approve the payment
(b) Entailment constraints
Figure 3: A simple example of a constrained workflow specification for a purchase order
system
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